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Abstract
We perform an experimental test of Maskin's canonical mechanism for Nash
implementation, using 3 subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as 3 outcomes,
states of nature, and integer choices. We nd that this mechanism successfully
implements the desired outcome a large majority of the time and an imbedded
comprehension test indicates that subjects were generally able to comprehend their
decision tasks. The performance can also be improved by imposing a ne on non-
designated dissidents. We oer some explanations for the imperfect implementation,
including risk preferences, the possibilities that agents have for collusion, and the
mixed strategy equilibria of the game.
Key Words: Implementation; Experiments; Mechanisms.
JEL classication: C72, C92, D70, D78.
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1 Introduction
A standard economic problem involves a central planner trying to implement an optimal
outcome. Often the planner has only highly constrained access to information about true
preferences. The theory of implementation addresses the problem of designing mechanisms
whose equilibria
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satisfy certain socially desirable properties, but which do not require that
the authorities have unrealistically accurate information about the underlying parameters
of the economy. The role of the authorities is simply to ascertain that the rules of the
game are respected by all participants and to implement the outcome decreed by the
mechanism.
Mechanism design is particularly important in economic environments with public goods,
as it is well known that a voluntary contributions mechanism will not implement a social
choice function which tries to achieve Pareto ecient outcomes. Suboptimal provision
is commonly found in experiments (Isaac and Walker 1988, e.g.), although the degree
of deciency of the voluntary contributions is not as high as predicted by neo-classical
theory. Since this mechanism is not able to achieve desired outcomes, it is important to
study alternatives.
Chen and Tang (1996) have done a comparative study of the basic quadratic mechanism
of Groves and Ledyard (1977) and the Paired-Dierence Mechanism by Walker (1981).
The Groves and Ledyard (1977) mechanism is only eective in a very constrained set of
environments (quasilinear preferences, linear production technologies), while the Walker
(1981) mechanism can handle more general environments, but can only implement the
Lindahl correspondence
2
. We study experimentally the canonical mechanism for im-
plementation in Nash equilibria (see Maskin 1977, Repullo 1987). This mechanism can
implement a wider variety of social choice rules, under a much larger domain of prefer-
ences, than the other mechanisms mentioned. Other mechanisms, like the one proposed
by Abreu and Matsushima (1992), can implement an even wider variety of social choice
functions (although the implementation is \virtual", i.e. with arbitrarily high probabil-
ity). But this mechanism has been criticised by Glaser and Rosenthal (1992) and this
criticism has been supported experimentally by Sefton and Yavas (1995). In addition,
Cabrales (1997) has shown that if the game dened by the mechanism and the agents'
preferences is played repeatedly by boundedly rational agents, the process converges to
the desired (and stable) solution.
3
Yet the mechanism is quite controversial. According
to Jackson (1992) \A nagging criticism of the theory is that the mechanisms used in
1
Or more appropriately, the equilibria of the game dened by the mechanisms and the state of the
world
2
Elbittar and Kagel (1997) have compared the performance of Moore's (1992) and Perry and Reny's
(1994) mechanisms to implement the ecient allocation of an indivisible private good among two players
(King Solomon's dilemma). Both mechanisms seem to perform inadequately.
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For this to be true the traditional assumption of monotonicity (Maskin 1977) is replaced by strict
monotonicity, the possible preference proles and outcomes of the social choice rule are nite (although
outcomes that are not part of the social choice rule can be innite), and some punishments are possible.
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the general constructive proofs have `unnatural' features." Moore (1992) also complains
that the mechanisms for Nash implementation are \highly complex - often employing
some unconvincing device such as an integer game." Under these circumstances it seems
appropriate to test the theory.
Our experiment models an environment where there are three states of the world (prefer-
ence proles) and three outcomes
4
. The preferences of the three agents cycle around these
three outcomes in the three states, but the social choice rule picks a specic one in each
state of Nature. We concentrate on such a rule for several reasons. First, we show that it
is not implementable in dominant strategies, so that it is natural to look for a mechanism
that implements in Nash equilibria. Furthermore, there is no focal choice in each state,
and some agent does suciently badly (in comparative terms) under the social choice rule
that telling the truth is not an obvious choice absent an enforcing mechanism. At the
same time the environment is simple enough to be handled by the subjects .
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This means
that one of issues raised against this mechanisms -namely complexity- is avoided in our
experiment. Therefore our work focuses on unnatural features -namely integer games-
and the existence of mixed strategy equilibria. We will see that we nd some support for
the latter.
The canonical mechanism has an innite strategy space; the agents are required to an-
nounce a state of the world, an outcome and an integer i 2 R
+
. If everyone announces the
same state, or if there is only one dissident from a consensus announcement, the integer is
not relevant in determining the outcome. If there is more than one dissident, the person
who announces the highest number gets her announced outcome. It is easy to prove that
such a game cannot have an equilibrium where, with positive probability, there is more
than one dissident. The artful part of the design is to permit and require the right kind of
consensus to be the equilibrium. One immediate problem is that it does not seem possible
to design an experiment with a truly innite strategy space. It is certainly not possible
to allow the announcement of arbitrarily large integers and at the same time have a nite
duration for the experiment. In our design we use a common modication of the mecha-
nism in which players can choose from a nite number (3 in our case) of integers, and the
winner is the player whose number is the remainder of the sum of announced integers.
With this modication, the mechanism implements the social choice rule in pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium, that is, the only pure-strategy Nash equilibrium outcome for each state
corresponds to the outcome of the social choice rule. However, there are mixed strategy
equilibria which have dierent outcomes with positive probability.
We have run 4 sessions with two treatments. The rst (the baseline treatment) uses
the mechanism as described. In the 2nd treatment, we introduce a ne if and only if
there is exactly one dissident and this person is not the designated dissident for the state
4
Although we focus on three outcomes, there could be innitely many in the economy; only three are
necessary for the mechanism.
5
The strategy space provides a couple of ways to test the comprehension achieved by the subjects.
There are good indications that the structure was well-understood by the participants.
4
announced by the majority.
6
The likelihood of the desired outcome being implemented was
.68 in the baseline treatment and .80 in the 2nd treatment. The rst thing to note is that
there is a very substantial degree of implementation under both treatments. Additionally
the introduction of nes makes the mechanism work signicantly better, which indicates
that there is nevertheless room for improvement to the canonical mechanism. We will
argue that the improvement of the mechanism might arise because of the destabilizing
eect of the nes on a mixed strategy equilibrium of the game.
2 The mechanism
Let us rst describe the environment in which the mechanism has to be used. There
are three individuals indexed by i 2 f1; 2; 3g; three possible outcomes: a; b; c; and three
states of the world: red, yellow, and green. The preferences of the individuals among the
outcomes in the three states of the world can be described by:
Preferences:
Player n state red yellow green
1 a  b  c b  c  a c  a  b
2 b  c  a c  a  b a  b  c
3 c  a  b a  b  c b  c  a
With these preferences any deterministic single-valued social choice function must, in
every state, assign the worst outcome in the preference ordering to one of the players.
This will be seen to have important implications for the properties of the mechanisms
that implement such social choice function.
We now introduce the social choice function that we wish to implement with our experi-
mental design:
Social choice function:
F (red) = a; F (yellow) = c; F (green) = b
Proposition 1. The social choice function F (:) cannot be implemented in dominant
strategies.
Proof: See the appendix.
6
The dissident is a designated dissident if and only if exactly two members of a group announce a
color and this color would give the dissident his highest payo if this color were the true state and all
members were to announce this color.
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This result makes apparent the necessity of implementing with a more demanding equi-
librium concept. The obvious choice in this case is to implement in Nash equilibrium.
We will use a version of the canonical mechanism for Nash implementation (Maskin 1977,
Repullo 1987, McKelvey 1989). Let us now describe the mechanism.
Strategy space: Let  = fr; y; gg be the set of states, where r represents red, y represents
yellow and g represents green. Let  = fa; b; cg, and N = f1; 2; 3g. The individual
strategies belong to  N .
Outcome function:
1. If the 3 individuals announce: r, the outcome is F (red) = a.
y, the outcome is F (yellow) = c.
g, the outcome is F (green) = b.
2. If exactly two agents announce r and:
the dissident is 1 who announces y, the outcome is b,
the dissident is 1 who announces g, the outcome is c,
otherwise the outcome is a.
3. If exactly two agents announce y and:
the dissident is 2 who announces r, the outcome is b,
the dissident is 2 who announces g, the outcome is a,
otherwise the outcome is c.
4. If exactly two agents announce g and:
the dissident is 3 who announces r, the outcome is c,
the dissident is 3 who announces y, the outcome is a,
otherwise the outcome is b.
5. If the three agents announce dierent states, then the integers announced by the
three players are added up.
If the integers add to 4 or 7 then the outcome is the one announced by player 1.
If the integers add to 5 or 8 then the outcome is the one announced by player 2.
If the integers add to 3, 6 or 9 then the outcome is the one announced by player 1.
Proposition 2. The previously described mechanism implements F (:) in pure strategy
Nash equilibrium.
Proof: See the appendix.
Notice that this mechanism implements the F (:) in pure strategy Nash equilibrium. There
are mixed strategy equilibria which produce outcomes dierent from the ones in F (:).
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Those equilibria will be useful to understand the experimental results. The classical ver-
sion of the canonical mechanism
7
implements in pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria.
The dierence in the mechanism is that in the classical version the players can announce
any integer, and the outcome is the one announced by the person who announces the
highest integer (ties can be broken arbitrarily). This mechanism presents a conceptual
problem, as the reason why no mixed strategy equilibrium exists is that a player may have
no best response for some mixed strategy proles of the opponents
8
. But, more signicant
from our point of view, it seems impossible to implement such a game in the laboratory.
There was no evident way to actually allow players to use any arbitrary integer and still
maintain a nite duration for the game. We could have said that players were allowed
to use arbitrary integers, but given that time is nite, this creates constraints on the
actual size of the integer and these constraints (like speed in writing zeros, or knowledge
of shorter ways to describe numbers) are not even common knowledge. For these reasons
we selected the present version of the mechanism.
Another important thing to notice is that the pure strategy equilibria of the mechanism
are such that some players are using a weak best response. The reason is that the outcome
these agents receive in equilibrium is the least preferred one for them. Thus, there would
be no harm in changing the strategy used, if the other players continue using the equi-
librium strategies. This, however, does not imply that the equilibrium strategy (which
involves announcing the true state) is weakly dominated for the player who gets the least
preferred outcome under F (:). It can be checked (from the table that summarizes payos
in the instructions) that there are some combinations of strategies for the other players
such that announcing the true state results in the most preferred outcome. Even tak-
ing this into account, it will be clear from the experimental results that the incentive to
deviate from the equilibrium is quite important.
However, there are some weakly dominated strategies. If an agent does not announce her
most preferred outcome under the true state of the world, she is using a strategy that is
weakly dominated (by another that announces the same state and integer and the most
preferred outcome). This will serve us as an indirect check (\rationality test") of the
degree of comprehension achieved by the agents about the working of the mechanism.
To check the importance of the fact that equilibrium strategies are weak best responses
for some agents, we created a modied version of the mechanism which modies rules 2,
3, and 4. By punishing a deviation from a dissident who is not the designated one. In
this way the mechanism implements in strict Nash equilibria, since all Nash equilibria are
strict. Since strict equilibria have to be in pure strategies, there is no need to emphasize
the pure strategy aspect here. The complete rules for the new mechanism can be found
in the instructions appendix, but we describe here the new rule 2.
2. If exactly two agents announce r and:
7
As exposed, for example in Repullo 1987.
8
See Jackson (1992).
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the dissident is 1 who announces y, the outcome is b,
the dissident is 1 who announces g, the outcome is c,
otherwise the outcome is a, and the dissident pays a ne of x pesetas.
As we will see in the data section, this change makes an important dierence in the
behavior of the players and the proportion of times that the outcome F (:) is attained.
The following corollary is straightforward from Proposition 2.
Corollary 2. The modied mechanism implements F (:) in strict Nash equilibrium.
3 Experimental design
Four sessions, each with 15 participants, were conducted at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in
Barcelona. The average net pay was about $10 per subject and sessions lasted less than
2 hours.
Achieving comprehension and salience in this experiment was a challenge. At the begin-
ning of a session, the instructions and a decision sheet were passed out to each subject.
The decision sheet stated the subject number and type. Instructions covered all rules
used to determine the outcome for each group and the resulting payos to each player in
the group; these were read aloud to the entire room. As the experimental set-up is not
a familiar environment, the instructions also contained an example where the states of
Nature were types of weather, the outcomes were activities, and the 3 types had dierent
state-dependent preferences among these activities.
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The complete instructions can be
found in the Appendix. To aid comprehension, we included complete payo tables and
seven exercise questions. These exercises were discussed aloud and questions were elded.
When the instructional phase was concluded, we proceeded with the session. As there
were 5 subjects of each type, we had 5 groups of three in each of the 10 rounds of the
experiment. These groups were varied - an anonymous matching process was devised so
that no two groups ever had the same composition. This non-repeat feature was common
knowledge.
At the start of a round, a monitor made a blind draw (with replacement) of a colored card
from a box held by the experimenter. This box contained 3 yellow, 4 green, and 5 red
cards.
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The color drawn was the state of Nature and was known to all. On their decision
sheets, participants then announced a color, an integer from f1; 2; 3g, and a preferred
outcome. If all three members of a group announced dierent colors, the sum of the
integers chosen determined which member's preferred outcome was implemented.
11
As
9
We thank James Costain for this idea.
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This deliberate asymmetry was an attempt to create a bit of friction, perhaps making successful
implementation somewhat more dicult.
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The process: if the sum of the 3 announced integers was 4 or 7, the declared outcome of the type 1
8
each type was aware of the true state of Nature, each type has a unique preference among
the possible outcomes. Thus, we have one rationality test imbedded in the experiment -
if a subject did not choose his preferred outcome, it would appear that the instructions
were not well-understood.
The decision sheets were collected, announcements collated, and outcomes and payos
determined. An individual's payo for the period was written on his or her decision sheet
(see Appendix YY) and the sheets were returned to the subjects. The next round was
then initiated by another draw from the box of colored cards. Everyone was aware that
the experiment would continue until 10 rounds were completed. At the end of the session,
subjects were paid based on the payos achieved in a randomly-selected round.
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As mentioned earlier, two types of sessions were conducted. The baseline session featured
payos of 500, 1000, or 1500 pesetas, with 500 pesetas added as a show-up fee. In the
2nd treatment, where we explore whether the disincentive of a ne would enhance the
mechanism's success rate, a ne of 100 or 200 pesetas (depending on the combination of
type and the state of Nature; see the instructions) was deducted from a non-designated
dissident's payo. This mechanism cannot guarantee that it is the dissident who is making
a false announcement, but false reporting certainly becomes riskier.
At the end of the session, each participant was paid individually and privately.
4 Results
Detailed data for all sessions are shown in Appendix ZZ. We nd that the social choice
function was successfully implemented in 68 of 100 instances (35 of 50 in session 1; 33 of
50 in session 2) in the baseline treatment. This rate increased to 80% (39 of 50 in session
3; 41 of 50 in session 4) in the treatment with a ne for a dissident. Figure AA shows
the rate of successful implementation by periods for each treatment. There is no clear
trend across time. The rationality test provided by the announced preferred outcomes also
indicates a reasonable level of general comprehension, as 34 of the 60 subjects selected the
appropriate outcome in all 10 rounds and the mean rationality \score" was 84%. Table
WW shows the distribution of rationality scores.
We also nd that the proportion of subjects who announce the true state follows the
consistent pattern where the likelihood of a true announcement is directly related to the
payo a subject would receive if all group members reported the state truthfully. This
pattern is reassuring and provides some evidence that the subjects understood the payos
in the game. In the baseline treatment, the likelihood of a true announcement is .93, .54,
person was chosen. If this sum was 5 or 8, the type 2's choice was implemented. It can be seen that this
resulted in each type having the same 1=3 probability of having his or her declared outcome selected.
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This was done to make payos more salient to the subjects, as this method makes the nominal payos
10 times as large as would be the case if payos were aggregated over 10 periods.
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and .23 for the 3 types, so that the overall rate of truth-telling is 56.7%. In the 2nd
treatment, these rates by type were .90, .66, and .45, with the overall rate of honest
reporting at 67.0%. Notice that the biggest behavioral change, where the associated rate
of truthful announcements nearly doubles, is observed for the type who would receive the
lowest payo if all types tell the truth.
The success of the mechanism in implementing F (:) is considerable. Comparing the ob-
served baseline success rate with the expected success rate of 1/3 for a random mechanism,
we nd that the test of proportions gives a t-statistic of 5.22, signicant at p << :01.
The success increases substantially when the implementation is performed with our ne
mechanism; the test of proportions between the two treatments gives a t-statistic of 1.95,
signicant at p < :03 (one-tailed test). In addition to the ne increasing the success rate,
we also nd that the ne also reduces the sample variance for the number of successful
implementations by 72%, from 2.40 in the baseline treatment to 0.67. There appears to
be less uncertainty in this environment. This inference is also supported by the observa-
tion that the integer game was needed to determine the outcome 18% of the time in the
baseline case, but with a likelihood of only 7% when a ne was possible.
5 Discussion
Two things stand out in the data. The rst is that although the mechanism achieves
substantial success, an outcome dierent from what F (:) indicates is still implemented
a non-negligible proportion of the time and the players who would not get their favorite
outcome with universal honesty make false announcements fairly frequently. The second
is that the observed behavior presents more truth telling when the nes are introduced.
We will now propose some potential explanations for these ndings in turn.
Let us rst concentrate on the game without nes. To make the analysis simpler, we will
focus the exposition on the case where the true state is red. An isomorphic analysis would
follow for yellow or green. When the true state is red the type 1 agent gets her favorite
outcome under F (:), type 3 gets her middle outcome and type 2 gets her worst outcome.
Notice that out of 45 possible true red announcements in the two sessions without a ne
(3 periods in the rst session and 6 periods in the second, with ve type 1 players in
each period) the type 1 announces red in 43 of them. It turns out that given the actual
strategies of the other types, this is indeed a best response. For this reason we need not
worry much about the behavior of type 1. The behavior of type 2 and type 3 is a little
harder to explain. Consider the game that results for player 2 and 3 once the strategy of
player 1 is xed. To simplify even further, assume that the three integers are used about
one third of the time and that players always announce their most favorite outcome in
the true state of the world (which are also in line with observed behavior). The game
between types 2 and 3 is then as follows:
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2n3 red yellow green
red 5, 10 5, 10 5, 10
yellow 5, 10 10, 15 10, 10
green 5, 10 10, 10 15, 5
In this reduced game the pair (red, red) is still an equilibrium, but notice that the strategy
red is weakly dominated for player 2. Also, strategy green is weakly dominated for player
3. This explains easily the small frequency of these strategies in the data.
After the elimination of red for 2 and green for 3, we could eliminate red for 3. In this
way we get to a component of equilibria which puts weight on yellow and green for 2
and all the weight on yellow for 3. Notice, however that once agent 1 is considered in
the game, the only equilibrium prole in that component is the one where 1 announces
red, 2 announces yellow, and 3 announces yellow (if 3 announces yellow with positive
probability, 1 would like to deviate to yellow or green). If instead we eliminate yellow
for 3, we have an equilibrium component where 2 uses green only, and 3 mixes between
red and yellow. If the probability of red by 2 is high enough, agent 1 does not want to
deviate. So, in principle, all of the observed behavior can more or less be accounted for
with some equilibrium in one of the components we just described.
Some readers may not nd this explanation entirely satisfactory. Notice that for player 3 to
use red, she must be certain that player 2 never uses yellow, which is rather counterfactual
if one looks at the data. However, remember that we did not tell the subjects what other
players had done in the past but only the payos obtained, so it is possible for a subject
of type 3 to maintain the belief that player 2 uses strategy green all the time given their
information
13
. Similarly, for player 2 to use yellow she must be certain that 3 does not
use green (this is less strong since it is not so counterfactual).
If one feels that these extreme beliefs are not very plausible, there is another way to
explain the observed behavior, by taking into account that the experimental design has not
controlled for risk preferences
14
. Consider what happens if we have a population composed
of agents with heterogeneous preferences for risk. The von-Neumann Morgenstern utilities
of the players for the 3 states can be described by (5; 10; x)
15
. The game now looks like
this:
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Notice that player 3 can obtain a payo of 15 even with a (green, yellow) strategy pair by winning
the integer game.
14
We could have used the binary lottery procedure (Roth and Malouf 1979), but there is considerable
controversy about whether this actually solves the problem or makes matter worse (Selten, Sadrieh and
Abbink 1995). From a practical point of view we thought that the instructions were already complicated
enough without adding one more level of complexity through the explanation of the binary lottery.
15
Remember that von Neumann Morgenstern utilities are invariant to ane transformations, which
gives two degrees of freedom in specifying them (slope and intercept), so this description is without loss
of generality.
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2n3 red yellow green
red 5, 10 5, 10 5, 10
yellow 5, 10 10, x
3
5+10+x
2
3
,
5+10+x
3
3
green 5, 10
5+10+x
2
3
,
5+10+x
3
3
x
2
, 5
Where x
2
is private information of player 2 and x
3
is private information of player 3.
Strategy red for 2 and green for 3 are still dominated, and we eliminate them. For
player 2 all risk averse agents choose yellow and all risk seeking agents choose green,
independently of the value of x
2
as long as both red and yellow are used by a positive
fraction of player 3.
The behavior of player 3 is a little harder to explain. Suppose players 3 knows that player
2 chooses yellow 50% of the time and green the remaining 50% (for this it suces that the
distribution of x
2
has 50% below 15 and 50 % above 15, the exact shape is immaterial).
They have to compare the payo of red which is 10, to the payo of yellow which is
1
2
x
3
+
1
2

5 +
x
3
3

. All risk seeking agents prefer yellow. The risk averse agents prefer red
as long as x
3
<
45
4
.
Under these conditions, we have that a game in which the value of x is lower than
45
4
for
at least 50% of the population, and another 50% is risk-prone has an equilibrium where
50% of player 2 uses yellow and the rest uses green, and 50% of player 3 uses red and
the rest yellow. This is qualitative similar to the observed data.
The games when the true state are yellow and green can be similarly analyzed. In the
case of yellow player 2 gets her favorite choice and almost always announces yellow . The
game for players 3 and 1 (who take the roles respectively of 2 and 3) is now:
3n1 yellow green red
yellow 5, 10 5, 10 5, 10
green 5, 10 10, 15 10, 10
red 5, 10 10, 10 15, 5
It can be seen that, with the appropriate relabeling, the analysis also follows in this case.
Finally, for true state green we have:
1n2 green red yellow
green 5, 10 5, 10 5, 10
red 5, 10 10, 15 10, 10
yellow 5, 10 10, 10 15, 5
The other relevant feature of the data is that the introduction of nes increases consider-
ably the amount of truth-telling by players 2 and 3, and consequently the proportion of
12
times that implementation is achieved. If we again simplify the game by assuming that
the true state is red, player 1 tells the truth and all integers are used one third of the
time, the game between types 2 and 3 is now as follows:
2n3 red yellow green
red 5, 10 5, 8 5, 8
yellow 4, 10 10, 15 10, 10
green 4, 10 10, 10 15, 5
Now strategy green is still weakly dominated for player 3 (and it is still observed very
infrequently). Strategy red is not weakly dominated any longer for player 2. The pair
(red, red) is now a strict Nash equilibrium in the reduced game. Unsurprisingly, the
proportion of truth telling for type 3 (the least favored one under F (:)) goes from 6/45
to 13/30, and for type 2 (the player who gets the middle outcome under F (:)) it jumps
from 23/45 to 22/30.
The component of equilibria that we mentioned in the analysis of results in the game
without nes still exist in the game with nes. We can use those equilibria (or the
heterogeneity in risk preferences), as we did before, to explain the remaining deviations
from implementation that are observed in the data.
6 Summary
We nd that the canonical mechanism for Nash implementation can be quite successful
in implementing the social choice function, with an observed success rate of 68% in the
baseline treatment. With the inclusion of a ne for \dissidence," the mechanism's per-
formance increases to 80%. While this is not perfect implementation, agents' behavior
can be better understood by taking into account possible risk preferences and the mixed
strategy equilibria of the underlying game. Criticisms that such a mechanism would prove
too complex seem to be unfounded here, as imbedded comprehension tests oer evidence
that most participants understood the structure of the environment. A note of caution is
due here, though. Our environment has only 3 states. It is conceivable that the perceived
complexity will increase dramatically when the number of states increases.
On the other hand, we found evidence that mixed strategy Nash equilibria matters con-
rming the criticism made by Jackson (1992) to the canonical mechanism. In our case
the problems caused by the mixed strategy equilibria can be signicantly reduced by a
simple modication of the game.
Our results suggest some further improvements for an implementation mechanism and
directions for future study. It is hoped that further empirical research will lead to enhanced
eectiveness in implementing desirable social choice functions.
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7 Appendix
Proposition 1. The social choice function F (:) cannot be implemented in dominant
strategies.
Proof: By contradiction. To implement F (:) in dominant strategies there must a strategy
set S, an outcome function g : S ! fa; b; cg , and strategies s
j
i
, such that s
j
i
is dominant
for agent i 2 f1; 2; 3g in state j 2 fr; y; gg (where r stands for red, y for yellow and g for
green).
Since g(:) implements F (:) we must have that g(s
r
1
; s
r
2
; s
r
3
) = a. Since a is the least favorite
outcome for player 2 under state r, and s
r
2
is dominant for 2 under r, we must have that
g(s
r
1
; s
y
2
; s
r
3
) = a. Similarly, since c is the least favorite outcome for player 3 under state
y, and s
y
3
is dominant for 3 under y, we must have that g(s
y
1
; s
y
2
; s
g
3
) = c. And also, since
b is the least favorite outcome for player 1 under state g, and s
g
1
is dominant for 1 under
g, we must have that g(s
r
1
; s
g
2
; s
g
3
) = b.
Now since s
r
1
is dominant for 1 under r and s
y
1
is dominant under y we must have that
g(s
r
1
; s
y
2
; s
g
3
)  g(s
y
1
; s
y
2
; s
g
3
) for player 1 under state r and g(s
r
1
; s
y
2
; s
g
3
)  g(s
y
1
; s
y
2
; s
g
3
) for
player 1 under state y. Since we just showed that g(s
y
1
; s
y
2
; s
g
3
) = c, this implies that
g(s
r
1
; s
y
2
; s
g
3
) 6= b.
Since s
y
2
is dominant for 2 under y and s
g
2
is dominant under g we must have that
g(s
r
1
; s
y
2
; s
g
3
)  g(s
r
1
; s
g
2
; s
g
3
) for player 2 under state y and g(s
r
1
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g
3
) for
player 2 under state g. Since we just showed that g(s
r
1
; s
g
2
; s
g
3
) = b, this implies that
g(s
r
1
; s
y
2
; s
g
3
) 6= a.
Since s
r
3
is dominant for 3 under r and s
g
3
is dominant under g we must have that
g(s
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; s
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3
)  g(s
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; s
y
2
; s
r
3
) for player 3 under state g and g(s
r
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) for
player 3 under state r. Since we just showed that g(s
r
1
; s
g
2
; s
g
3
) = a, this implies that
g(s
r
1
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y
2
; s
g
3
) 6= c.
Since g(s
r
1
; s
y
2
; s
g
3
) 6= b, g(s
r
1
; s
y
2
; s
g
3
) 6= a, and g(s
r
1
; s
y
2
; s
g
3
) 6= c, and there are no other
outcomes we reach a contradiction and the result follows. 2
This result is useful to know because it makes apparent the necessity of implementing with
a more demanding equilibrium concept. The obvious choice in this case is to implement
in Nash equilibrium.
Strategy space: Let  = f
1
; 
2
; 
3
g,  = fa; b; cg,
Proposition 2. The previously described mechanism implements F (:) in pure strategy
Nash equilibrium.
Proof: First, notice that a strategy prole in which all agents announce the true state
is a Nash equilibrium, as the only agent who can change the outcome in that case is the
one who already has her favorite outcome.
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Now we show that outcomes which are not desired by the social choice function cannot
be the outcome of a pure strategy equilibrium. For this we consider several subcases:
1. Suppose that all agents are announcing untruthfully the same state. In this case
there is an agent (agent 1 if the consensus is r, agent 2 if it is y, and 3 if it is g)
which can change the outcome and strictly improve by announcing the true state.
2. Suppose that exactly 2 agents are announcing the same state. One of those agents
is not getting her favorite outcome. That agent can change her announcement of
the state in such a way that three dierent states will be announced. She can also
choose the integer so that the outcome she announces is selected. If she chooses her
favorite outcome she will obtain a strict improvement.
3. Suppose that the outcome is determined by looking at the integers. Then, either of
the agents that is not obtaining her favorite outcome can change her announcement
of the integer so that the outcome she announces is the one selected. If she also
announces her favorite outcome she obtains a strict improvement.
Since this exhausts all cases, the results follows.2
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INSTRUCTIONS (First treatment)
Thank you for participating in this experiment. In this experiment, there are 10 periods
and 3 types of people. The result of on of those periods will determine the money that
you will receive in this experiment. We have given you a sheet of paper with spaces to do
an announcement in every period. Your identication number and your type are printed
on them and will not change during the experiment. In each period, you will be in a
group with two other people, so that every group has one person of each type. The other
people in your group will not be constant for all ten periods; instead, participants will be
re-matched, by identication numbers, with others for each period. While you may be
matched with the same person(s) on more than one occasion, you will not know it and at
no point will you ever know the identication number or the identity of the other group
members in any period.
Your benets in each period are determined by the combination of the \state of nature"
(a color drawn randomly), your \preferences" in that state of nature, and one of the 3
possible \outcomes" that will be the decreed by a central processor in each period using
the information given by the groups members. The state of nature (red, yellow or green) is
obtained randomly at the beginning of the period and is revealed to all the participants.
The 3 dierent types of people have dierent preferences among the outcomes in each
state of nature and consequently dierent benets in every case.
Each period you will make an announcement about the state of nature in that period.
You can announce any color you wish (it does not have to be the color that was drawn).
Your announcement does not change your preferences nor the state of nature, but is part
of the information used by the central procesor to determine the outcome. The state
of nature is the color of a card drawn randomly from a box in which there are 3 yellow
cards, 4 green cards, and 5 red cards. The card drawn is shown publicly to everyone in the
room. An announcement includes both a color, and outcome and an integer from f1; 2; 3g.
The central processor will use the integers and the announced outcome to determine the
decreed outcome when each of the 3 group members announces a dierent color.
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Although these terms are intended to be quite general, here is a specic example:
Consider the state of nature to be the \weather", the announcement to be a "weather
report" and the outcome to be an \activity". Suppose the weather may be either \hot"
(red), \warm" (yellow), or \cold" (green), and that there are 3 possible activities: ex-
ercising (a), watching TV (b), and reading (c). Think of the 3 types as three dierent
siblings and the central processor as an absent tutor, who must decide on an activity for
her children for the day without knowing the weather, using only the weather reports of
her ospring.
If the weather is hot (red):
A type 1 prefers exercise (a), next prefers watching TV (b), and least prefers reading (c).
A type 2 prefers watching TV (b), next prefers reading (c), and least prefers exercise (a).
A type 3 prefers reading (c), next prefers exercise (a), and least prefers watching TV (b).
If the weather is warm (yellow ):
A type 1 prefers watching TV (b), next prefers reading (c), and least prefers exercise (a).
A type 2 prefers reading (c), next prefers exercise (a), and least prefers watching TV (b).
A type 3 prefers exercise (a), next prefers watching TV (b), and least prefers reading (c).
If the weather is cold(green):
A type 1 prefers reading (c), next prefers exercise (a), and least prefers watching TV (b).
A type 2 prefers exercise (a), next prefers watching TV (b), and least prefers reading (c).
A type 3 prefers watching TV (b), next prefers reading (c), and least prefers exercise (a).
The following table summarizes this information:
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red yellow green
1 a > b > c b > c > a c > a > b
2 b > c > a c > a > b a > b > c
3 c > a > b a > b > c b > c > a
MONETARY BENEFITS IN PESETAS FOR THE CHOSEN PERIOD
We assume that there is a monetary equivalent for the utility enjoyed by the activities.
The 9 statements below describe the money received by the three types of players in each
state of nature:
In state red,
a type 1 receives 1500 with outcome a, 1000 with outcome b, and 500 with outcome c.
a type 2 receives 500 with outcome a, 1500 with outcome b, and 1000 with outcome c.
a type 3 receives 1000 with outcome a, 500 with outcome b, and 1500 with outcome c.
In state yellow:
a type 1 receives 500 with outcome a, 1500 with outcome b, and 1000 with outcome c.
a type 2 receives 1000 with outcome a, 500 with outcome b, and 1500 with outcome c.
a type 3 receives 1500 with outcome a, 1000 with outcome b, and 500 with outcome c.
In state green:
a type 1 receives 1000 with outcome a, 500 with outcome b, and 1500 with outcome c.
a type 2 receives 1500 with outcome a, 1000 with outcome b, and 500 with outcome c.
a type 3 receives 500 with outcome a, 1500 with outcome b, and 1000 with outcome c.
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OUTCOME RULES
1. If the 3 group members announce:
red, then the outcome is a.
yellow, then the outcome is c.
green, then the outcome is b.
We can summarize this information in the following way:
RRR=a, YYY=c, GGG=a
The rst capital letter denotes the announcement of type 1 (R stands for red, A for
yellow and G for green), the second capital letter is the announcement of type 2,
the third capital letter is the announcement of type 3, and the lowercase letter after
the equal sign denotes the outcome given those announcements.
2. If exactly two group members people announce red, the outcome is a, unless the
group member announcing something dierent is a type 1.
In that case if the type 1 announces:
yellow, the outcome is b. green, the outcome is c.
RRY=a, RRG=a, RYR=a, RGR=a, YRR=b, GRR=c.
3. If exactly two group members people announce yellow, the outcome is c, unless the
group member announcing something dierent is a type 2.
In that case if the type 2 announces:
red, the outcome is b. green, the outcome is a.
YYR=c, YYG=c, RYY=c, GYY=c, YRY=b, YGY=a.
4. If exactly two group members people announce green, the outcome is b, unless the
group member announcing something dierent is a type 3.
In that case if the type 3 announces:
red, the outcome is c. yellow, the outcome is a.
GYG=b, GRG=b, YGG=b, RGG=b, GGY=a, GGR=c.
5. If all 3 members of a group announce dierent colors, then the central processor
adds the three integers selected by the 3 group members. The processor in this case
will decree the announced outcome (a, b, or c) by one of the group members.
That group member is chosen in the following way:
If the total of the 3 integers chosen is 4 or 7, then the group member is the type 1
person.
= If the total of the 3 integers chosen is 5 or 8, then the group member is the type
2 person.
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If the total of the 3 integers chosen is 3, 6,or 9, then the group member is the type
3 person.
RYG(3)=3, RYG(4)=1, RYG(5)=2, RYG(6)=3, RYG(7)=1, RYG(8)=2,
RYG(9)=3.
The number in parenthesis to the right of the equal sign is the sum of the announced
integers, and the number to the left of the equal sign is the type of the agent whose
announced outcome will become the decreed outcome. The same thing that happens
with AVR also happens with ARV, VAR, VRA, RAV, RVA.
(Notice that there are as many combinations which sum to 4 or 7 -exactly 9- as
there are for 5 or 8, or even 3, 6 or 9).
PROCEDURE
When the experiment begins, a color will be randomly drawn and you you will write an
announcement in your sheet. The announcement consist of declaring at the same time a
state of the world (red, yellow or green), an integer in f1; 2; 3g, and an otcome in fa; b; cg.
The announcement sheets will then be collected and the announcements will be processed
to determine the outcome, either a, b, or c.
The experimenter will then compute your benets for the period and your announcement
sheet will be returned to you with these indicated. You will only be informed of your
payos. You will not be informed of the announcements or payos of other group members.
Next we will proceed to the following period. At the end of 10 periods, the experiment will
end. Each person will receive a show-up fee and the the benets obtained in the period
selected to be the payment period. Each person will be paid individually and privately.
The payment period will be chosen at random at the end of the experiment. We will have
cards numbered from 0 to 10. A student will select one of these cards at random and the
number of the card selected will determine the payment period.
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EXERCISES
To ensure that people understand how the mechanism works, we will do some exercises.
1. Suppose that the monitor draws a red card and all group members announce red.
What is the outcome? What is the state of nature? What are the payos for the
type 1 person? the type 2 person? the type 3 person?=
2. Suppose that the monitor draws a red card and types 2 and 3 announce red, while
type 1 announces green. What is the outcome? What is the state of nature? What
are the payos for the type 1 person? the type 2 person? the type 3 person?
3. Suppose that the monitor draws a green card and types 1 and 3 announce green,
while type 2 announces red. What is the outcome? What is the state of nature?
What are the payos for the type 1 person? the type 2 person? the type 3 person?
4. Suppose that the monitor draws a green card and all group members announce
yellow? What is the outcome? What are the payos for the type 1 person? the
type 2 person? the type 3 person?
5. Suppose that the monitor draws a green card and types 1 and 3 announce yellow,
while type 2 announces green. What is the outcome? What are the payos for the
type 1 person? the type 2 person? the type 3 person?
6. Suppose the monitor draws a yellow card, types 1, 2, and 3 announce (respectively)
red, yellow, and green, the integers 1, 2, and 3, and the outcomes a, b, and c. What
is the outcome? What are the payos for the type 1 person?=20 the type 2 person?
the type 3 person?
7. Suppose the monitor draws a yellow card, types 1, 2, and 3 announce (respectively)
red, yellow, and green, the integers 1, 2, and 2, and the outcomes c, b, and c. What
is the outcome? What are the payos for the type 1 person?=20 the type 2 person?
the type 3 person?
Once the experiment begins, all communication between participants is strictly forbidden.
Please ask questions before we begin. Are there any questions?
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The following tables may be of help in summarizing the information about payos.
Announcements True state
R Y G
RRR 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
RRY 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
RRG 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
RYR 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
RGR 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
YRR 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
GRR 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
YYY 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
YYR 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
YYG 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
GYY 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
RYY 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
YGY 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
YRY 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
GGG 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
YGG 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
RGG 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
GYG 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
GRG 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
GGY 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
GGR 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
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Payments when the three group members announce dierent states.
Sum of integers Selected type and True state
announces outcome R Y G
3 3, a 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
3 3, b 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
3 3, c 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
4 1, a 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
4 1, b 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
4 1, c 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
5 2, a 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
5 2, b 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
5 2, c 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
6 3, a 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
6 3, b 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
6 3, c 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
7 1, a 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
7 1, b 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
7 1, c 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
8 2, a 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
8 2, b 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
8 2, c 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
9 3, a 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
9 3, b 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
9 3, c 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
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INSTRUCTIONS (Second treatment)
Thank you for participating in this experiment. In this experiment, there are 10 periods
and 3 types of people. The result of on of those periods will determine the money that
you will receive in this experiment. We have given you a sheet of paper with spaces to do
an announcement in every period. Your identication number and your type are printed
on them and will not change during the experiment. In each period, you will be in a
group with two other people, so that every group has one person of each type. The other
people in your group will not be constant for all ten periods; instead, participants will be
re-matched, by identication numbers, with others for each period. While you may be
matched with the same person(s) on more than one occasion, you will not know it and at
no point will you ever know the identication number or the identity of the other group
members in any period.
Your benets in each period are determined by the combination of the \state of nature"
(a color drawn randomly), your \preferences" in that state of nature, and one of the 3
possible \outcomes" that will be the decreed by a central processor in each period using
the information given by the groups members. The state of nature (red, yellow or green) is
obtained randomly at the beginning of the period and is revealed to all the participants.
The 3 dierent types of people have dierent preferences among the outcomes in each
state of nature and consequently dierent benets in every case.
Each period you will make an announcement about the state of nature in that period.
You can announce any color you wish (it does not have to be the color that was drawn).
Your announcement does not change your preferences nor the state of nature, but is part
of the information used by the central procesor to determine the outcome. The state
of nature is the color of a card drawn randomly from a box in which there are 3 yellow
cards, 4 green cards, and 5 red cards. The card drawn is shown publicly to everyone in the
room. An announcement includes both a color, and outcome and an integer from f1; 2; 3g.
The central processor will use the integers and the announced outcome to determine the
decreed outcome when each of the 3 group members announces a dierent color.
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Although these terms are intended to be quite general, here is a specic example:
Consider the state of nature to be the \weather", the announcement to be a "weather
report" and the outcome to be an \activity". Suppose the weather may be either \hot"
(red), \warm" (yellow), or \cold" (green), and that there are 3 possible activities: ex-
ercising (a), watching TV (b), and reading (c). Think of the 3 types as three dierent
siblings and the central processor as an absent tutor, who must decide on an activity for
her children for the day without knowing the weather, using only the weather reports of
her ospring.
If the weather is hot (red):
A type 1 prefers exercise (a), next prefers watching TV (b), and least prefers reading (c).
A type 2 prefers watching TV (b), next prefers reading (c), and least prefers exercise (a).
A type 3 prefers reading (c), next prefers exercise (a), and least prefers watching TV (b).
If the weather is warm (yellow ):
A type 1 prefers watching TV (b), next prefers reading (c), and least prefers exercise (a).
A type 2 prefers reading (c), next prefers exercise (a), and least prefers watching TV (b).
A type 3 prefers exercise (a), next prefers watching TV (b), and least prefers reading (c).
If the weather is cold(green):
A type 1 prefers reading (c), next prefers exercise (a), and least prefers watching TV (b).
A type 2 prefers exercise (a), next prefers watching TV (b), and least prefers reading (c).
A type 3 prefers watching TV (b), next prefers reading (c), and least prefers exercise (a).
The following table summarizes this information:
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red yellow green
1 a > b > c b > c > a c > a > b
2 b > c > a c > a > b a > b > c
3 c > a > b a > b > c b > c > a
MONETARY BENEFITS IN PESETAS FOR THE CHOSEN PERIOD
We assume that there is a monetary equivalent for the utility enjoyed by the activities.
The 9 statements below describe the money received by the three types of players in each
state of nature:
In state red,
a type 1 receives 1500 with outcome a, 1000 with outcome b, and 500 with outcome c.
a type 2 receives 500 with outcome a, 1500 with outcome b, and 1000 with outcome c.
a type 3 receives 1000 with outcome a, 500 with outcome b, and 1500 with outcome c.
In state yellow:
a type 1 receives 500 with outcome a, 1500 with outcome b, and 1000 with outcome c.
a type 2 receives 1000 with outcome a, 500 with outcome b, and 1500 with outcome c.
a type 3 receives 1500 with outcome a, 1000 with outcome b, and 500 with outcome c.
In state green:
a type 1 receives 1000 with outcome a, 500 with outcome b, and 1500 with outcome c.
a type 2 receives 1500 with outcome a, 1000 with outcome b, and 500 with outcome c.
a type 3 receives 500 with outcome a, 1500 with outcome b, and 1000 with outcome c.
The gains described here will be modied in some cases, as described in
points 2, 3 and 4 of page 3.
28
OUTCOME RULES
1. If the 3 group members announce:
red, then the outcome is a.
yellow, then the outcome is c.
green, then the outcome is b.
We can summarize this information in the following way:
RRR=a, YYY=c, GGG=a
The rst capital letter denotes the announcement of type 1 (R stands for red, A for
yellow and G for green), the second capital letter is the announcement of type 2,
the third capital letter is the announcement of type 3, and the lowercase letter after
the equal sign denotes the outcome given those announcements.
2. If exactly two group members people announce red, the outcome is a, unless the
group member announcing something dierent is a type 1.
In that case if the type 1 announces:
yellow, the outcome is b. green, the outcome is c.
RRY=a, RRG=a, RYR=a, RGR=a, YRR=b, GRR=c.
If the announcement is RRY or RRG, then the group member of type 3 will receive
200 pesetas less than the quantity shown in page 3. If the announcement is RYR
or RGR, then the group member of type 2 will receive 100 pesetas less than the
quantity shown in page 3. This is ilustrated in the table of page 7.
3. If exactly two group members people announce yellow, the outcome is c, unless the
group member announcing something dierent is a type 2.
In that case if the type 2 announces:
red, the outcome is b. green, the outcome is a.
YYR=c, YYG=c, RYY=c, GYY=c, YRY=b, YGY=a.
If the announcement isRYY orGYY, then the group member of type 1 will receive
200 pesetas less than the quantity shown in page 3. If the announcement is YYR
or YYG, then the group member of type 2 will receive 100 pesetas less than the
quantity shown in page 3. This is ilustrated in the table of page 7.
4. If exactly two group members people announce green, the outcome is b, unless the
group member announcing something dierent is a type 3.
In that case if the type 3 announces:
red, the outcome is c. yellow, the outcome is a.
GYG=b, GRG=b, YGG=b, RGG=b, GGY=a, GGR=c.
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If the announcement isGYG orGRG, then the group member of type 2 will receive
200 pesetas less than the quantity shown in page 3. If the announcement is YGG
or RGG, then the group member of type 1 will receive 100 pesetas less than the
quantity shown in page 3. This is ilustrated in the table of page 7.
5. If all 3 members of a group announce dierent colors, then the central processor
adds the three integers selected by the 3 group members. The processor in this case
will decree the announced outcome (a, b, or c) by one of the group members.
That group member is chosen in the following way:
If the total of the 3 integers chosen is 4 or 7, then the group member is the type 1
person.
= If the total of the 3 integers chosen is 5 or 8, then the group member is the type
2 person.
If the total of the 3 integers chosen is 3, 6,or 9, then the group member is the type
3 person.
RYG(3)=3, RYG(4)=1, RYG(5)=2, RYG(6)=3, RYG(7)=1, RYG(8)=2,
RYG(9)=3.
The number in parenthesis to the right of the equal sign is the sum of the announced
integers, and the number to the left of the equal sign is the type of the agent whose
announced outcome will become the decreed outcome. The same thing that happens
with AVR also happens with ARV, VAR, VRA, RAV, RVA.
(Notice that there are as many combinations which sum to 4 or 7 -exactly 9- as
there are for 5 or 8, or even 3, 6 or 9).
PROCEDURE
When the experiment begins, a color will be randomly drawn and you you will write an
announcement in your sheet. The announcement consist of declaring at the same time a
state of the world (red, yellow or green), an integer in f1; 2; 3g, and an otcome in fa; b; cg.
The announcement sheets will then be collected and the announcements will be processed
to determine the outcome, either a, b, or c.
The experimenter will then compute your benets for the period and your announcement
sheet will be returned to you with these indicated. You will only be informed of your
payos. You will not be informed of the announcements or payos of other group members.
Next we will proceed to the following period. At the end of 10 periods, the experiment will
end. Each person will receive a show-up fee and the the benets obtained in the period
selected to be the payment period. Each person will be paid individually and privately.
The payment period will be chosen at random at the end of the experiment. We will have
cards numbered from 0 to 10. A student will select one of these cards at random and the
number of the card selected will determine the payment period.
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EXERCISES
To ensure that people understand how the mechanism works, we will do some exercises.
1. Suppose that the monitor draws a red card and all group members announce red.
What is the outcome? What is the state of nature? What are the payos for the
type 1 person? the type 2 person? the type 3 person?=
2. Suppose that the monitor draws a red card and types 2 and 3 announce red, while
type 1 announces green. What is the outcome? What is the state of nature? What
are the payos for the type 1 person? the type 2 person? the type 3 person?
3. Suppose that the monitor draws a green card and types 1 and 3 announce green,
while type 2 announces red. What is the outcome? What is the state of nature?
What are the payos for the type 1 person? the type 2 person? the type 3 person?
4. Suppose that the monitor draws a green card and all group members announce
yellow? What is the outcome? What are the payos for the type 1 person? the
type 2 person? the type 3 person?
5. Suppose that the monitor draws a green card and types 1 and 3 announce yellow,
while type 2 announces green. What is the outcome? What are the payos for the
type 1 person? the type 2 person? the type 3 person?
6. Suppose the monitor draws a yellow card, types 1, 2, and 3 announce (respectively)
red, yellow, and green, the integers 1, 2, and 3, and the outcomes a, b, and c. What
is the outcome? What are the payos for the type 1 person?=20 the type 2 person?
the type 3 person?
7. Suppose the monitor draws a yellow card, types 1, 2, and 3 announce (respectively)
red, yellow, and green, the integers 1, 2, and 2, and the outcomes c, b, and c. What
is the outcome? What are the payos for the type 1 person?=20 the type 2 person?
the type 3 person?
Once the experiment begins, all communication between participants is strictly forbidden.
Please ask questions before we begin. Are there any questions?
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The following tables may be of help in summarizing the information about payos.
Announcements True state
R Y G
RRR 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
RRY 1500, 500, 800 500, 1000, 1300 1000, 1500, 300
RRG 1500, 500, 800 500, 1000, 1300 1000, 1500, 300
RYR 1500, 400, 1000 500, 900, 1500 1000, 1400, 500
RGR 1500, 400, 1000 500, 900, 1500 1000, 1400, 500
YRR 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
GRR 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
YYY 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
YYR 500, 1000, 1400 1000,1500, 400 1500, 500,900
YYG 500, 1000, 1400 1000,1500, 400 1500, 500,900
GYY 300, 1000, 1500 800,1500, 500 1300, 500,1000
RYY 300, 1000, 1500 800,1500, 500 1300, 500,1000
YGY 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
YRY 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
GGG 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
YGG 900, 1500, 500 1400, 500, 1000 400, 1000,1500
RGG 900, 1500, 500 1400, 500, 1000 400, 1000,1500
GYG 1000, 1300, 500 1500, 300, 1000 500, 800,1500
GRG 1000, 1300, 500 1500, 300, 1000 500, 800,1500
GGY 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
GGR 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
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Payments when the three group members announce dierent states.
Sum of integers Selected type and True state
announces outcome R Y G
3 3, a 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
3 3, b 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
3 3, c 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
4 1, a 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
4 1, b 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
4 1, c 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
5 2, a 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
5 2, b 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
5 2, c 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
6 3, a 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
6 3, b 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
6 3, c 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
7 1, a 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
7 1, b 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
7 1, c 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
8 2, a 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
8 2, b 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
8 2, c 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
9 3, a 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000, 1500 1000, 1500, 500
9 3, b 1000, 1500, 500 1500, 500, 1000 500, 1000,1500
9 3, c 500, 1000, 1500 1000,1500, 500 1500, 500,1000
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RESULTS
Baseline Treatment
Session 1
Group
1 2 3 4 5
Period True Ann. Out. Ann. Out. Ann. Out. Ann. Out. Ann. Out. Number of
State States States States States States Socially
Preferred
Outcomes
1 Y RYR a YRR b YYY c GYY c YYY c 3
2 Y YYG c RYG a YYY c YYR c RYG b 3
3 G GRR c GGG b GRG b YRG a YRG c 2
4 G GGG b GGG b YRR b YGG b YRG c 4
5 R RGY b RGR a RGG b RYR a GGY a 3
6 G GRR c RGG b RGG b YGG b YGG b 4
7 Y YYY c GYR b YYR c YYY c GYY c 4
8 R RYR a RYR a RYR a RGY b RGR a 4
9 G GGG b YGG b RGG b YGG b YGG b 5
10 R RGR a RYY c RGR a RYG c RGR a 3
35
Key: R=red, Y=yellow, G=green. Each triplet of announced states is in the order type1, type2, type 3
for that group.
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Baseline Treatment
Session 2
Group
1 2 3 4 5
Period True Ann. Out. Ann. Out. Ann. Out. Ann. Out. Ann. Out. Number of
State States States States States States Socially
Preferred
Outcomes
1 R RRG a RRR a RRR a RGR a RRR a 5
2 R RRY a RGY a YGY a RGY b RGR a 4
3 G YGG b GGG b GRG b RRG a YRG c 3
4 R RGR a RYR a RRY a RGY b RYY c 3
5 Y YYR c YYR c YYR c YYG c GGR c 5
6 R RGR a RYR a RGY a RYR a RYR a 5
7 R RGY b RYY c RYY c RGR a RYR a 2
8 G GRG b RRG a YRG a RRG a YGG b 2
9 Y GYG b RYR a YYR c YYR c YYG c 3
10 R RYY c RGY c RGY b RGR a RYY c 1
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Key: R=red, Y=yellow, G=green. Each triplet of announced states is in the order type1, type2, type 3
for that group.
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Fine Treatment
Session 1
Group
1 2 3 4 5
Period True Ann. Out. Ann. Out. Ann. Out. Ann. Out. Ann. Out. Number of
State States States States States States Socially
Preferred
Outcomes
1 R RRR a RYY c RGR a RGY a RGR a 4
2 R RYR a YRG a RRY a RYR a RGR a 5
3 G YGG b YGG b GRR c GRG b YGG b 4
4 Y YYR c YYG c YYG c YGY a GYR a 3
5 R RYY c YYR c RYR a RRR a RRY a 3
6 Y YGY a GYG b YYY c YYR c GYY c 3
7 Y YYG c GYR b YYR c YYR c GYY c 4
8 G RGG b RGG b GGG b YGG b GGG b 5
9 G GGG b GGG b GGG b RRG a RGG b 4
10 Y GYY c GYY c YYG c GYR a YYG c 4
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Key: R=red, Y=yellow, G=green. Each triplet of announced states is in the order type1, type2, type 3
for that group.
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Fine Treatment
Session 2
Group
1 2 3 4 5
Period True Ann. Out. Ann. Out. Ann. Out. Ann. Out. Ann. Out. Number of
State States States States States States Socially
Preferred
Outcomes
1 Y YYY c GYY c YYR c GYY c YYY c 5
2 Y YYG c GGY a GYG b YGY a GYY c 2
3 R RRR a RYR a RYR a RYR a RRR a 5
4 R RGR a RRR a RRR a RRR a RRR a 5
5 G GRG b RGG b YGG b YRG b YGG b 5
6 Y YYG c YYR c GYY c GYY c YGY a 4
7 R RGR a RRY a RYR a RYY c RRR a 4
8 G GRG b GRG b RRG a RGG b GGG b 4
9 G RRG a GGG b RGG b GGR c GGG b 3
10 Y YYR c YGR c YYR c GYG b RYY c 4
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Key: R=red, Y=yellow, G=green. Each triplet of announced states is in the order type1, type2, type 3
for that group.
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COLORS REPORTEDBY 2ND-FAVOREDAND LEAST FAVOREDPLAYER
UNDER F (:)
No Fine
True State = R
Session/Period # R by 3 # Y by 3 # Y by 2 # G by 2
1/5 2 2 1 4
1/8 4 1 3 2
1/10 3 1 2 3
2/1 4 0 0 1
2/2 1 4 0 4
2/4 2 3 2 2
2/6 4 1 3 2
2/7 2 3 3 2
2/10 1 4 2 3
Totals 23 19 16 23
True State = Y
Session/Period # Y by 1 # G by 1 # G by 3 # R by 3
1/1 3 1 0 2
1/2 3 1 2 2
1/7 3 2 0 2
2/5 4 1 1 4
2/9 3 1 2 3
Totals 16 6 5 13
True State = G
Session/Period # G by 2 # R by 2 # R by 1 # Y by 1
1/3 0 5 0 2
1/4 3 2 0 3
1/6 4 1 2 2
1/9 5 0 1 3
2/5 2 3 1 2
2/9 1 4 2 2
Totals 15 15 6 14
38
Fine
True State = R
Session/Period # R by 3 # Y by 3 # Y by 2 # G by 2
3/1 3 2 1 3
3/2 3 1 2 1
3/5 3 2 3 0
4/3 5 0 3 0
4/4 5 0 0 1
4/7 3 1 2 1
Totals 22 6 11 6
True State = Y
Session/Period # Y by 1 # G by 1 # G by 3 # R by 3
3/4 4 1 2 2
3/6 3 2 1 1
3/7 3 2 1 3
3/10 2 3 2 1
4/1 3 2 0 1
4/2 2 3 2 0
4/6 3 2 1 1
4/10 3 1 1 3
Totals 23 16 12 10
True State = G
Session/Period # G by 2 # R by 2 # R by 1 # Y by 1
3/3 3 2 0 3
3/8 5 0 2 1
3/9 4 1 2 0
4/5 3 2 1 3
4/8 2 3 2 0
4/9 4 1 2 0
Totals 21 9 9 7
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FIGURE 1
Successful Implementations by Round
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FIGURE 2
Rationality Test Scores
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